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ARGUMENT
1. The Court of Appeals Was Incorrect When It Affirmed An Order That Requires Mr.
Richardson to Provide Support for His Adult Children.
It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant future alimony adjustments based
upon the minor children reaching the age of majority and the subsequent termination of child
support payments. Mrs. Richardson argues that Mr. Richardson failed to adequately marshal the
evidence. See Appellee's Brief, at pp. 14-15. However, Mr. Richardson is not challenging a
finding of fact, but rather the law that the trial judge applied to the facts before him.
Mrs. Richardson further states that Mr. Richardson mischaracterizes the trial court's
alimony award. See Appellee's Brief, at pp. 15. There has been no mischaracterization. The
trial court's award that increased alimony upon the termination of child support makes sense
under only two scenarios. Both scenarios constitute an abuse of discretion. First, the court
expected that Mrs. Richardson would use some child support funds to maintain her own standard
of living and then when child support stopped, she would need an increase in alimony to
continue under the same standard. This expectation by the court was evidenced when it stated:
While a significant amount of [Mrs. Richardson's] expenses can now be attributed
to minor children in the home, a good part of the income needed by [Mrs.
Richardson] to maintain the appropriate standard of living is also attributable to
child support payments from [Mr. Richardson]. See R. at 229
Second, the court expected that Mrs. Richardson would continue to support the children for a
time after they reached eighteen, and the court did not want Mrs. Richardson to bear the full
financial burden of providing such support. This expectation by the court was evidenced when it
stated:
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[Rjeasonable expenses associated for a time with older children will not
necessarily diminish to zero as they reach eighteen. See R. at 228-229.
If the first scenario was the basis for the court's award, the award was improper because
"[cjourt ordered child support is an obligation imposed for the benefit of the children, not the
divorcing spouse." Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253,256 (Utah 1987).
If the second scenario was the basis for the court's award the award was improper
because it forced Mr. Richardson to continue to provide support for his adult children, albeit by
funding Mrs. Richardson, who was in turn supporting the adult children. Neither the legislature,
nor other courts have seen fit to impose a responsibility to support able-bodied adult children
past age eighteen, or the graduation from high school. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to require such in this case.
The fact that this particular family had a history of children remaining in the home past
eighteen is no justification for requiring Mr. Richardson to supplement Mrs. Richardson's
income so that she can continue to support the adult children. Either parent may elect to assist
adult children. It should be the choice of the parent - not the order of the court that dictates such
assistance. It is not proper for the court to order Mr. Richardson to increase alimony because
Mrs. Richardson chose to support adult children.
The holding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals opens the door for any court to
ignore the Uniform Civil Liability Act at Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-1 et seq. by requiring a parent
to continue to support their adult children through the guise of alimony, any time the court sees
fit. While, a practical matter, parents typically support their children into adulthood, the law
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makes no requirement past age eighteen. If a parent wishes, they have the legal right to
completely cut off a child upon its eighteenth birthday. This rarely happens because parents
have love and compassion for their children that continues past age eighteen, but as far as the law
is concerned, the parent has met their legal responsibility as soon as that child turns eighteen or
graduates from high school. To require more is an abuse of discretion.
2. The Court of Appeals Was Incorrect When It Affirmed An Order of Future Adjusting
Alimony.
Not only was it an abuse of discretion to require Mr. Richardson to provide support for his
adult children, but it was also an abuse for the court to make future alimony adjustments based
on speculative events. The general rule governing future adjustments to alimony is set forth by
Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5(8)(g)(ii). It states:
The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address
needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
There are no such extenuating circumstances in this case. Mr. Richardson recognizes that courts
have, on rare occasions, found extenuating circumstances justifying deviation from the general
rule. However, such cases deviate from the well established standard and are easily
distinguishable from our case. In Westenskow v. Westenskow, 562 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1977), the
court allowed a future adjustment of alimony because it found that the party paying the alimony
was likely to have a significant increase in income. In that case, after granting future alimony
increases, the court said that if the party's income was seriously and permanently decreased he
could at that point prove the necessity for a modification. Id. at 1257. There, the party paying
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the alimony would know that they needed to petition for a modification. In our case the alimony
increases are based, not on an increase in Mr. Richardson's income, but in a decrease in the child
support payments Mrs. Richardson is receiving.
At the time when alimony adjusts in the future, Mrs. Richardson's income (hence her
ability to meet her needs) is now not known; her marital circumstances (hence, contribution to
joint living expenses) is now not known; and the physical ability for the Parties to be able to
work is now not known. Under Westenskow, the future knowledge of the circumstances is with
the person paying the alimony, not the person receiving it.
This Court stated well the rule of law that governs this case, "[w]e deem it best that the
changes in alimony either downward or upward should be left to future determinations by the
court under its continuing jurisdiction." McLean v. McLean, 523 P.2d 862, 863 (Utah 1974).
The parties have not made an agreement that they will support the children past age eighteen and
the minor children have not stated that they intend to reside with Mrs. Richardson after they turn
eighteen. Therefore, the determination of the need for alimony should be left until such time as
it becomes necessary. If Mrs. Richardson finds that as the children reach eighteen and the child
support payments stop that she is unable to maintain her standard of living then, and only then,
will it be proper for her to petition the court for an increase in alimony. As it stands, the trial
court's award runs contrary to the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act found at Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-45-1 through 78-45-13, the statute governing future alimony adjustments found at
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5, and the rule set forth in multiple cases cited in this reply and the
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appeal brief Therefore, the trial court's award granting future alimony increases is an abuse of
discretion and must be reversed.
3. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Creates Inconsistent Tax Results.
As stated in the Appellant's Brief, the Decision of the Court of Appeals sets a precedent
that will likely create inconsistent tax consequences. While this issue may not have been
properly preserved for appeal, it is still proper for this Court to review the public policy concerns
raised by the precedent created by the Court of Appeals.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Kenneth Richardson requests a reversal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
DATED this j£_

day of February, 2008.
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